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I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Government spends approximately $500 billion per year
on procurement actions to support government work, including contracts
for products and services.1 Roughly eighty percent of those contracts are
awarded to small businesses.2 With the rise of the Internet, initiating a
contract with the Federal Government has become easier than ever through
the use of on-line electronic portals, known as e-tools,3 that provide
efficient and cost-effective means to do business with the government. 4
Despite the ease of access, the execution of a government contract is a
complicated process.5 Businesses who choose to engage in government
contracts become subject to federal statutes and regulations, including the
Anti-Kickback Act (Act), 41 U.S.C. §§ 51-55 (1986), that may be new or
foreign to the normal course of business and may leave small businesses
with the burden of compliance that is excessive and beyond its functional
capabilities.6
Even though an individual contract may set out penalties for the
violation of its terms, many times the incorporated regulations include civil
penalties beyond the parameters of the contract.7 Civil penalties clauses,
like the one in the Act, set forth monetary damages that the government
may recover from violators under two conditions: 1) outright violations,
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and 2) knowing violations of the statute.8 The civil penalty provision at §
55 of the Act states:
(a) Amount.—The Federal Government in a civil action may recover
from a person—
that knowingly engages in conduct prohibited by section [53] 9 of this title
a civil penalty equal to—
twice the amount of each kickback involved in the violation; and
not more than $10,000 for each occurrence of prohibited conduct; and
whose employee, subcontractor, or subcontractor employee violates
section [53] of this title by providing, accepting, or charging a kickback a
civil penalty equal to the amount of that kickback. 10

Section 55(a)(2) imposes a civil penalty in the amount of the kickback
for outright violations of the Act.11 Section 55(a)(1) imposes a higher
penalty of twice the amount of the kickback plus additional per-occurrence
forfeitures for knowing violations.12 Knowing violations of a statute are
typically penalized more harshly because they involve a scienter13
requirement that is typically reserved for criminal punishments.14 The
scienter analysis is complicated for a corporate violator because the court
must determine what the corporation “knows.”15
In order to hold a corporation liable for “knowing” violations, the
Fifth Circuit and other courts have historically applied common law rules of
agency and have held employers liable for the torts of employees who act
within the scope of their employment or for the benefit of the employer.16
However, in United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., a
case of first impression in the Fifth Circuit, the Circuit Court held that
liability could be imputed upon a corporation for knowing violations of the
Anti-Kickback Act regardless of whether the violating employee was acting
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41 U.S.C. § 53 (1986), amended by 41 U.S.C. § 8702 (2011) (prohibiting any person from
providing, attempting or offering to provide, soliciting, accepting, or attempting to accept a
kickback or charging the amount of the kickback to any government contractor or subcontractor).
Id. § 55, amended by 41 U.S.C. § 8706.
Id.
Id.
Scienter is defined as “[a] degree of knowledge that makes a person legally responsible for the
consequences of his or her act or omission; the fact of an act’s having been done knowingly . . . .”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (9th ed. 2009).
41 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1), amended by 41 U.S.C. § 8706.
United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 727 F.3d 343, 354 (5th Cir. 2013)
(Jolly, J., concurring).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958); see also United States v. Ridglea State
Bank, 357 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1966); Standard Oil Co. of Tex. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128
(5th Cir. 1962).
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within the scope of his employment or for the benefit of the corporation.17
This holding opens the door for excessive corporate liability for the actions
of employees at all levels of the corporate ladder.18
This Note argues that, in Kellogg, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit inappropriately determined that vicarious liability could
be imputed to a corporation under § 55(a)(1) of the Act by dismissing its
punitive characteristics and disregarding the application of the act-for-thebenefit-of-the-principal rule of agency. Section II provides a background of
the treatment of punitive damages and the application of vicarious liability
under similar federal statutes. Section III discusses the facts and findings of
the Fifth Circuit in Kellogg. Finally, Section IV argues why the court
inappropriately applied vicarious liability under § 55(a)(1) of the Act by
dismissing its punitive characteristics and disregarding the application of
the act-for-the-benefit-of-the-principal doctrine.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The U.S. Government contracts with commercial entities19 to fulfill its
requirements for services and supplies.20 These contracts must conform to
the rules of the Federal Acquisition Regulations.21 Depending on the
services or supplies being acquired, government contracts vary from simple
acquisitions to complex contracts.22 Each contract has a different structure
and cost scheme.23 Requirements contracts are those established to fulfill
the requirements of a government entity when those future needs cannot be
clearly defined.24 One type of requirements contract is an indefinite
delivery/indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract.25
IDIQ contracts provide for an indefinite quantity of services or goods
over a fixed period of time.26 These contracts are used when the
Government cannot determine the precise quantities or timing of supplies or
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Kellogg, 727 F.3d at 348–49.
Ridglea, 357 F.2d at 498.
Once a contract is formed, the commercial firm is known as a “prime contractor” because they
hold the prime contract with the government. Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. § 3.502-1
(2014).
Getting Started with GSA Purchasing Programs, U.S. GEN. SERVICES ADMIN.,
http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/105347?utm_source=FAS&utm_medium=printradio&utm_term=HDR_4_Prchsng_gettingstarted&utm_campaign=shortcuts (last visited Feb. 2,
2015).
See generally 48 C.F.R. §§ 1.000-1.707.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 16.504.
Id.

350

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 39

services that are needed.27 Once the need is determined, the Government
issues discrete task orders under the contract for contractor execution.28
Although cost structures of IDIQ contracts differ, one common type of cost
structure is “cost-plus.”29 Under a cost-plus contract, the contractor
receives its cost of performance plus a predetermined markup, which is
typically a percentage of cost.30 Under this type of cost structure, the
Government bears the burden of shifting requirements or changes in market
prices.31 In addition to the markup cost, the contractor also receives a fee
for its services.32 This fee may be based on a sliding scale or be
predetermined, depending on the terms of the contract.33
No matter the type of contract awarded, the Government must include
any applicable laws that affect the performance of the contract within the
terms of the contract.34 These laws, known as “flow downs,” may be
incorporated in full text within the contract or may only be incorporated by
reference.35 As the term implies, these requirements must also “flow down”
to any subcontractors acquired to assist in performance of the work.36 The
Anti-Kickback Act must be included in every contract with a value
exceeding $150,000.37
The Anti-Kickback Act originated in 1946 in response to private
companies paying government contractors kickbacks to gain valuable
military subcontracts during World War II (WWII).38 A kickback is a type
of commercial bribe where “a percentage of income is given to a person in
a position of power or influence as payment for having made the income
possible.”39 The Government, and ultimately the taxpayers, bore the burden
of these WWII kickbacks because the subcontractor would include the
amount in its invoice to the prime contractor, who would then up-charge the
fee, in addition to any markups and award fees, to the Government.40
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Id. § 16.304-.306.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. §§ 52.200-.253-1.
Id. Incorporation is a method of making a secondary document part of a primary document by
including in the primary document a statement that the secondary document should be treated as if
it were contained within the primary one. Laws incorporated by reference are still in full force
and effect under the contract. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 781 (9th ed. 2009).
48 C.F.R. § 52.203-6.
Id. § 3.502-3.
S. REP. NO. 99-435, at 3 (1986).
Kickback, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/kickback?s=t (last visited
Feb. 2, 2015).
United States v. Acme Process Equip. Co., 385 U.S. 138, 143 (1966); United States v. Purdy, 144
F.3d 241, 242-43 (2d Cir. 1998).
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Realizing the improper and unethical nature of these bribes, Congress
passed the Act to prevent government contractors and subcontractors from
accepting them.41
The Act was amended in 1986 by the Anti-Kickback Enforcement
Act, which was intended to strengthen the prohibition of kickbacks relating
to government contracts.42 Before this amendment, when a contractor was
found in violation of the statute, the Government was only allowed to
collect the amount of the kickback.43 The amendments added a provision in
the civil liability clause that allowed the Government to recover damages in
the amount equal to double the value of the kickback plus $10,000 per
occurrence, for knowing violations of the Act.44 The provision that
addressed damages in the amount of the kickback was expanded from a
single entity, individual, or corporation, to include any kickback received
by an employee or subcontractor of that entity.45 The divergence of the
original provision is the subject of Kellogg.46
The relevant language found in § 55 of the Act at the time of the
alleged violation is as follows:
(a) Amount.—The Federal Government in a civil action may recover
from a person—
that knowingly engages in conduct prohibited by section 5347 of this title a
civil penalty equal to—
twice the amount of each kickback involved in the violation; and
not more than $10,000 for each occurrence of prohibited conduct; and
(2) whose employee, subcontractor, or subcontractor employee violates
section 53 of this title by providing, accepting, or charging a kickback a
civil penalty equal to the amount of that kickback.48

Because Kellogg was a case of first impression for the Fifth Circuit,
no precedent existed to address the treatment of these two clauses with
respect to the imposition of vicarious liability on a corporation whose
employee violated the Act.49 Consequentially, the court examined the
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Purdy, 144 F.3d at 242–43.
Anti-Kickback Enforcement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-634, 100 Stat. 3523.
41 U.S.C. § 51 (1982), repealed by Anti-Kickback Enforcement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-634,
100 Stat. 3523.
Act of Nov. 7, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-634, § 5, 100 Stat. 3523 (1986); H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, at 10
(1986).
Act of Nov. 7, 1986 § 5; H.R. REP. NO. 99-964, supra note 44.
See United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 727 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2013).
41 U.S.C. § 53 (1986), amended by 41 U.S.C. § 8702 (2011) (prohibiting any person from
providing, attempting or offering to provide, soliciting, accepting, or attempting to accept a
kickbacks or charging the amount of the kickback to any government contractor or subcontractor).
Id. § 55, amended by 41 U.S.C. § 8706.
Kellogg, 727 F.3d at 344.
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application of vicarious liability in federal statutes similar to the AntiKickback Act.50
A. Vicarious Liability
Under § 55(a)(1) of the Anti-Kickback Act, the corporation must
knowingly violate the Act in order to be liable for double damages and the
per occurrence penalty.51 Because a corporation is a legal entity, it cannot
of itself possess a mental state.52 History has shown that the acts and
mental states of a corporation’s employees may be imputed upon the
corporation if those employees acted to benefit the corporation.53 However,
in cases where the damages sought are punitive in nature, the requisite
mental state (scienter) cannot be imputed to a corporation.54
1. Act-for-the-benefit-of-the-principal
The act-for-the-benefit-of-the-principal doctrine states that an agent is
only authorized to act for the benefit of the principal, and he may not seek
personal advantage through his actions as an agent.55 Based on Fifth
Circuit precedent, vicarious liability may be imputed to a corporation when
the employee is acting within the scope of his employment or for the
benefit of the corporation.56 Historically, the Fifth Circuit has applied the
act-to-benefit analysis to show that vicarious liability does not
automatically arise under an employer/employee relationship.57 To satisfy
the analysis, the corporation need not actually benefit from the actions of
the employee, but the employee must have acted with the intent to benefit
the corporation.58
When evaluating whether a corporation could be held criminally liable
for the unauthorized actions of its employees, the Fifth Circuit stated in
Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. United States that the employee’s purpose to
benefit the corporation is decisive to equate the employee’s actions with
that of the corporation.59 If the act was performed with a view of furthering

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 345.
42 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1), amended by 41 U.S.C. § 8706.
See 10 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 4877 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2012).
Id.
Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 528 (1999).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 39 cmt. a (1958).
United States v. Ridglea State Bank, 357 F.2d 495, 500 (5th Cir. 1966).
Id. at 498-99; Standard Oil Co. of Tex. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128 (5th Cir. 1962).
Standard Oil, 307 F.2d at 128.
Id.
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the corporation’s business, then the expectation of benefit makes the act
that of the principal.60
Even though Standard Oil involved imputing criminal liability, the
Fifth Circuit has extended its holding to civil actions based on statutory
provisions that carry punitive penalties.61 In United States v. Ridglea, the
court opined that a corporation could not acquire a specific wrongful intent
through the actions of unfaithful servants who acted to advance the interests
of parties other than their employer.62 In Ridglea, the executive vice
president of a bank knowingly approved fraudulent Federal Housing
Administration loans for which he received a percentage of the proceeds.63
The court held that civil liability for the acts of the vice president could not
be imputed to the bank because he was clearly acting to benefit himself.64
The vice president’s approval of loans he knew would default was actually
detrimental to the bank.65 Because he was not acting to benefit the bank,
his actions and personal knowledge of his misdeeds were not imputed to the
bank.66
During the Vietnam War, the Fifth Circuit declined to hold a
corporation liable in United States v. Hangar One, Inc., a case similar to
Kellogg.67 In Hanger One, the defendant corporation held a contract with
the Government to provide ammunition to support the Vietnam War.68
While performing the contract, some of the corporation’s employees
overlooked defects in the ammunition on the production line and allowed
defective ammunition to be sold to the Government.69 Because there was
no benefit in providing defective products to the Government, the circuit
court held that the corporation was not liable for the actions of its
employees because they were not acting to benefit the corporation.70
2. Damages
Although courts are still divided as to whether statutory clauses
allowing the government to recover “double damages” are punitive or
remedial, the trend is moving toward considering these provisions
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Id.
Ridglea, 357 F.2d at 498.
Id. (citing Standard Oil, 307 F.2d at 129); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 217D
cmt. d, 235 (1958).
Ridglea, 357 F.2d at 498.
Id.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Hangar One, Inc., 563 F.2d 1155, 1158 (5th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 1156.
Id.
Id. at 1158.

354

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 39

punitive.71 Once a clause is declared punitive, it should be strictly
construed to only impute the requisite scienter to a corporation when the
authority of the actor is clear.72
Dating back to 1818, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a principal
cannot be held liable for punitive damages imposed due to the unauthorized
misdeeds of its agents.73 Courts have consistently applied this doctrine over
time in cases concerning general punitive damages and statutory clauses
with punitive penalties.74
In Hyslop v. United States, the Court held that statutory clauses that
are punitive must be strictly construed to limit the imposition of vicarious
liability upon a corporation.75 The policy behind such application is that
punitive penalties are intended to punish the offender.76 As a result, it
would be improper to punish a corporation for the actions of an employee
that was not clearly acting on behalf of the corporation.77
III. EXPOSITION OF THE CASE
In Kellogg, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
considered two questions: 1) whether 41 U.S.C. § 55(a)(2) extended
vicarious liability to an employer for the acts of its employees and 2) if
vicarious liability did apply, whether the Government adequately imputed
that liability on Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. (“KBR”).78 In response to the
first issue, the Fifth Circuit Court held that an employer could be held
vicariously liable for the actions of its employees under 41 U.S.C. § 55
(a)(2).79 As to the second issue, the court remanded to the trial court to
determine whether the facts of this case justify imputed liability.80 This
Note is limited to the first issue in Kellogg.

71.
72.
73.

74.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 532–33 (1999); see also United States v. Halper, 490
U.S. 435, 447–49 (1989); Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 93 (1997).
Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 532–33.
The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. 546, 558-59 (1818) (holding that actual wrongdoers in marine
trespass are responsible for exemplary damages, but the owners of the privateers are not
responsible beyond the actual loss or injury sustained).
Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 114-15 (1893); Dudley v. Wal-mart
Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317, 1322–23 (11th Cir. 1999); Harris v. L&L Wings, Inc., 132 F.3d 978,
983-85 (4th Cir. 1997); Hyslop v. United States, 261 F.2d 786, 792 (8th Cir. 1958).
Hyslop, 261 F.2d at 792.
Id.
Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 544.
United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 727 F.3d 343, 348 (5th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 348–49.
Id. at 351.
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A. Facts and Procedural Posture
KBR was a prime contractor who provided global logistical services
to Army installations across the globe for the U.S. Department of
Defense.81 KBR’s agreement with the government, known as the Logistics
Civil Augmentation Program III (LOGCAP III), was structured as an IDIQ
contract.82 The terms of LOGCAP III allowed KBR to bill the Army its
cost of performance, including the cost of subcontractors, plus a one
percent markup and an award fee of up to two percent.83 Under LOGCAP
III, the Army would issue discrete task orders to KBR, which KBR could
self-perform or perform through retention of subcontractors. 84 KBR
engaged two subcontractors, EGL, Inc. (EGL) and Panalpina, Inc.
(Panalpina), to assist in the execution of task orders issued between 2002
and 2006 for the transportation of military equipment and supplies in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Kuwait.85
According to the Government, KBR accepted kickbacks from both
EGL and Panalpina in exchange for favorable treatment, including
“overlooking service failures and continuing to award new subcontracts . . .
despite such failures.”86 The allegations focus on KBR’s Corporate Traffic
Supervisor for LOGCAP III, Robert Bennett.87 As the Corporate Traffic
Supervisor, Bennett was responsible for the oversight of EGL and
Panalpina and for approving invoices submitted by the two
subcontractors.88 From 2002 to 2006, Bennett and four of his colleagues,
who also worked in the transportation department, accepted kickbacks on at
least ninety-three occasions from Kevin Smoot, managing director of
EGL’s freight forwarding station, and other EGL employees who were
acting under Smoot’s direction.89 These kickbacks included meals, drinks,
golf outings, tickets to rodeo events, baseball games, football games, and
other gifts and entertainment.90 From 2003 to 2006, Bennett accepted
kickbacks from Panalpina through its account representative, Grant
Wattman, and other employees acting under Wattman’s direction on at least

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 344–45.
Id. at 345.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Complaint of United States at 27–28, United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown &
Root, Inc., 727 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2013) (No. 1:04CV00042), 2010 WL 3198716, at *27–28).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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fifty-five occasions.91 Like the EGL kickbacks, the Panalpina kickbacks
included “meals, drinks, golf outings, and other gifts and entertainment.”92
This action commenced when two individuals brought a qui tam
action93 against KBR, Bennett, and others for the kickback scheme.94 In
this case, the Government intervened and filed its own complaint alleging a
violation of the Act under 41 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1), among other claims.95
KBR moved to dismiss the Government’s complaint on the ground that it
failed to state a claim for civil liability because 41 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1) does
not permit vicarious liability.96 The trial court agreed and granted KBR’s
motion to dismiss stating that the plain language of § 55(a)(1) does not
allow for vicarious liability, and the Government had not sufficiently
alleged that KBR employees were acting for the company’s benefit. 97
Subsequently, the Government voluntarily dismissed all other claims and
proceeded in this appeal solely on the § 55(a) claim.98
B. Majority Opinion
Keeping in mind the procedural posture of this case, the Fifth Circuit
Court only considered whether the district court properly granted KBR’s
motion to dismiss.99 The entire premise of this suit lies within the language
of the Act100 as it appeared during the term of KBR’s contract with the
Department of Defense.101 Section 52(2) defined a “kickback” as:
any money, fee, commission, credit, gift, gratuity, thing of value, or
compensation of any kind that is provided to a prime contractor, prime
contractor employee, subcontractor, or subcontractor employee to

91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
A qui tam suit is,
a lawsuit that is brought by a private citizen against a person or company who is
believed to have violated the law during performance under a government contract or
in violation of a government regulation that allows for such suits. In a qui tam suit, the
private citizen is allowed to participate in the suit and receive a portion or all of the
proceeds received as a result. Modernly, this type of suit is more commonly referred
to as a “whistle blower” case. In certain cases, the Government may intervene and
bring an action on its own right.
Qui Tam Action, LEGALDICTIONARY.COM, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/
qui+tam+action (last visited Nov. 11, 2014).
94. Kellogg, 727 F.3d at 345.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 346.
99. Id.
100. 41 U.S.C. §§ 51-56 (1986), amended by 41 U.S.C. § 8702 (2011).
101. Kellogg, 727 F.3d at 346.
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improperly obtain or reward favorable treatment in connection with a
prime contract or a subcontract relating to a prime contract.102

Section 53 stated that:
A person may not—
(1) provide, attempt to provide, or offer to provide a kickback;
(2) solicit, accept, or attempt to accept a kickback; or
(3) include the amount of a kickback prohibited by paragraph (1) or (2) in
the contract price—
(A) a subcontractor charges a prime contractor or a higher tier
subcontractor; or
(B) a prime contractor charges the Federal Government. 103

Section 52(3) defined “person” to include an “individual” and a
“corporation, partnership, business association of any kind, trust, [or] jointstock company.”104 Section 55(a), the civil liability clause in question,
stated:
(a) Amount.—The Federal Government in a civil action may recover
from a person—
(1) that knowingly engages in conduct prohibited by section 53 of this
title a civil penalty equal to—
twice the amount of each kickback involved in the violation; and
not more than [$11,000]105 for each occurrence of prohibited conduct; and
(2) whose employee, subcontractor, or subcontractor employee violates
section 53 of this title by providing, accepting, or charging a kickback a
civil penalty equal to the amount of that kickback.106

The majority began its opinion with the statute’s legislative history and the
1986 amendments to the Act.107 In those amendments, Congress added
civil damages remedies in § 55(a)(1) by permitting recovery of double
damages and per occurrence penalties from prime contractors who
knowingly violate the Act.108 In § 55(a)(2), Congress added recovery of the
value of the kickback from prime contractors and higher tier subcontractors

102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 52(2), amended by 41 U.S.C. § 8702).
Id. at 348 (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 53, amended by 41 U.S.C. § 8702).
Id. at 346 (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 52(3), amended by 41 U.S.C. § 8702).
“Acting under the authority of the Federal Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of
1990, 28 U.S.C. § 2461 (2006), the Department of Justice increased the amount of the penalty in §
55(a)(1)(B) from $10,000, its original statutory amount, to $11,000. 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(13).” Id.
at 347 n.6.
106. Id. at 346 (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 55(a), amended by 41 U.S.C. § 8706).
107. Id. at 347.
108. Id.

358

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 39

for violations of their employees.109 Because the Government was only
seeking damages under § 55(a)(1), the court only addressed the “double
damages” portion of the statute.110
1. Does the Act extend vicarious liability to an employer for the acts of its
employees?
To interpret the language of the statute, the majority began with its
plain meaning.111 The district court held that if vicarious liability were to
apply to a corporation in § 55(a)(1), then it would render § 55(a)(2)
superfluous. However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that
assertion, distinguishing the double damages plus a per occurrence penalty
for knowing violations of the Act, from the strict liability penalty for
outright violations.112 As written, a corporation is strictly liable for the
kickbacks accepted by its employees under § 55(a)(2), but also may be held
liable for additional damages under § 55(a)(1) for knowing violations of the
Act.113 The majority reasoned that it is entirely consistent for the statute to
punish knowing violations more severely than those of which the
corporation was unaware.114 As a result, the court held that § 55(a)(2) of
the statute allows for imputation of vicarious liability to a corporation for
knowing violations of the Act.115
In consideration of the second issue in the case, the court examined
KBR’s arguments regarding the act-for-the-benefit-of-the-principal doctrine
and the punitive nature of the damages sought by the Government in this
case.116
2. Did the Government properly impute liability on KBR?
The majority looked to the Restatement (Second) of Agency and case
law to determine whether liability was properly imputed on KBR.117
Generally, an employer is subject to liability for a tort committed by its
employee who was acting within the scope of his employment.118 If the
employee acted outside of his scope of employment, the principal may still
be liable if the employee purported to act or to speak on behalf of the
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 348–49.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 349–54.
Id. at 349.
Id.
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principal, and the third party relied on the employee’s apparent authority.119
In this case, the Government did not dispute that the employee was acting
outside of his employment.120 Consequentially, KBR asserted that because
the damages in § 55(a)(1) of the statute were punitive, the statute required a
narrow application of liability imposed only by those employees who were
acting for the benefit of the corporation.121
a. Act-for-the-Benefit-of-the-Principal
The district court in Kellogg relied on the act-for-the-benefit-of-theprincipal analysis in United States v. Ridglea State Bank.122 In Ridglea, the
Government was seeking double damages of $25,500 that were grossly
disproportionate to its actual loss of $2,040.123 Because the offending
employees could be criminally punished individually for their wrongful
acts, the court held that punishing the corporation for the same misdeeds
would offend the idea of double jeopardy124 because it would punish twice
for the same wrongs.125 Subsequently, the Ridglea court borrowed the
criminal law standard for vicarious liability under the double jeopardy
theory and held that the knowledge of the agent not acting with a purpose to
benefit the employer could be imputed to the employer when the individual
is liable under another statute requiring knowledge or guilty intent.126
Essentially, the knowledge of the employee could not, at the same time, be
his individual knowledge and that of the corporation.127
Refusing to adopt the act-for-the-benefit-of-the-principal test, the
Kellogg majority reasoned that Ridglea was an isolated case that has not
been followed in any other civil action.128 As an exception to the rule, the
Kellogg majority held that Ridglea stood only to show that the court must
examine the facts of the case to determine whether the remedy is proper.129

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 349–50.
Id. at 350.
Id. at 345.
Id. at 350 (citing United States v. Ridglea State Bank, 357 F.2d 495, 498 (5th Cir. 1966) (a False
Claims Act action seeking double damages)).
Id. (citing Ridglea, 357 F.2d at 498).
Double jeopardy is a term used in criminal cases to indicate that a person may not be prosecuted
or sentenced twice for the same offense. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 528 (9th ed. 2009). In this
case, the court was concerned that the corporation was being punished multiple times for the same
offense because it would be forced to pay back the actual damages more than twelve times under
the automatic forfeiture clause of the False Claims Act. Ridglea, 357 F.2d at 499–500.
Kellogg, 727 F.3d at 350–51 (citing Ridglea, 357 F.2d at 499-500).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 351.
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b. Damages
The majority distinguished the present case from Ridglea by pointing
out that the False Claims Act applicable to that case contained a provision
of a mandatory $2000 forfeiture.130 The court did not have the option to
impose a lesser penalty.131 In this case, the Act allowed some flexibility
where the court may impose up to the $11,000132 per occurrence penalty,
but is not required to impose the entire penalty amount.133 As a result, the
court found that the penalty available in the present case was not per se
excessive in comparison to the actual kickbacks received because the court
could tailor the penalty to the violation.134
KBR claimed the damages available in § 55(a)(2) were punitive and
therefore demanded a narrow application of vicarious liability.135 The
majority disagreed and cited Cook County v. United States ex rel.
Chandler136 which held that damages set forth by Congress in statutes such
as these do not equate to classic punitive damages because they are limited
to the maximum amounts set forth by statute.137 Contrarily, classic punitive
damages leave the jury to decide the amount to be imposed.138 Therefore,
the majority held that the restrictive view of vicarious liability was not
proper in this case because the damages contained in the Act were not
punitive in nature.139
c. Apparent Authority
After rejecting the act-for-the-benefit-of-the-principal test and
dismissing the punitive penalty of the Act, the majority turned to the
decision in Association of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corp.
(ASME), which set out the elements required to assert vicarious liability
under federal civil provisions.140 In ASME, the Court considered whether a
non-profit organization could be held liable for its members’ violations of
130. Id. at 352.
131. Id.
132. “Acting under the authority of the Federal Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of
1990, 28 U.S.C. § 2461 (2006), the Department of Justice increased the amount of the penalty in §
55(a)(1)(B) from $10,000, its original statutory amount, to $11,000. 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(13).” Id.
at 347 n.6.
133. Id. at 352.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 353.
136. Cook Cnty. v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119 (2003) (involving a False Claims Act
violation).
137. Kellogg, 727 F.3d at 353.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 349; see also Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
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the Sherman Antitrust Act.141 The Court stated that principals are liable for
the torts of their agents when the agent acted with apparent authority even
when the agent acted only to benefit himself.142 Further, the Court
stipulated that the damages afforded under the Sherman Antitrust Act were
not punitive in such a way that they would trigger a more restrictive rule on
liability.143 Instead, the damages were primarily intended as a remedy for
the victim and as a deterrent for future violations, not as punishment for the
violator.144 Accordingly, the Court held the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers liable for the indiscretions of its members.145
Applying the same standard to this case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the Government properly imputed liability on KBR based on an
employee’s apparent authority; however, the case was remanded for trial to
determine whether that liability extended to include the particular employee
in question in this case.146
C. Judge Jolly’s Concurrence
Judge E. Grady Jolly agreed that the case should be remanded, but
disagreed with the majority’s approach.147 Judge Jolly claimed that the
majority engaged in a poor attempt of statutory interpretation without
considering the meaning of words in the statute.148
The case centered around the language contained in § 55(a)(1) which
stated that any “person” that knowingly violates the Act is subject to the
penalties contained in this section.149 The majority quickly determined that
because “person” was defined to include any “corporation,” vicarious
liability could be imputed upon a corporation under § 55(a)(1).150
However, the analysis of the text should not have ended there.151
According to Judge Jolly, it is important to take the totality of the clause
into account when determining its meaning.152
When reading § 55(a) of the Act, it is apparent the word “person”
applies not only to § 55(a)(1), but also § 55(a)(2).153 Therefore, § 55(a)
applies to a person (1) who knowingly violates the Act and a person (2)
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Kellogg, 727 F.3d at 349.
Id. at 350.
Id.
Id. at 351.
Id.
Id. at 353–54.
Id. (Jolly, J., concurring).
Id. at 354.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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whose employee violates the Act.154 There is no dispute that the word
“person” includes corporations.155 If the interpretation of the text was to
end at the word “person,” it must be assumed that it would apply to
employees of a corporation.156 However, taking the language of § 55(a) as
a whole, the question then becomes: which employees?157
Section 55(a)(1) contains language that requires the “person” to have
knowledge of the violation.158 Due to the nature of a corporation, the
requisite knowledge must be drawn from the knowledge of an individual
because corporations cannot in and of themselves possess knowledge of any
kind.159 Judge Jolly cited Fletcher’s Cyclopedia of Corporations section
790, which states, “[A] court may deem only the knowledge of officers and
employees at a certain level of responsibility imputable to the
corporation.”160 Knowledge of a lower level employee is ordinarily not
imputed upon a corporation.161 Applying these rules to the text, § 55(a)(1)
only allows for vicarious liability where the employee’s authority,
responsibility, or managerial role within the corporation allows for their
knowledge to be imputed to the corporation.162 “The acts of a corporation’s
vice-principals are considered to be the acts of the corporation itself;”163
therefore, the knowledge is not vicarious, but direct.164 If the court were to
adopt this standard, then vicarious liability may not apply because the
requisite knowledge may be satisfied by the direct knowledge of the
corporation.165
In order to impute an employee’s knowledge to a corporation, the
employee must not only have apparent authority, but must also have
sufficient responsibility or authority within the company to attribute his
knowledge to the corporation itself.166 As a result, the issue of whether
§ 55(a)(1) allows for vicarious liability and whether the specific employee
in this case has the apparent authority to bind the corporation are not

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 355 (quoting 10 FLETCHER, supra note 52, § 790).
Id.; 10 FLETCHER, supra note 52, § 807; F.D.I.C. v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166, 171 (5th Cir.
1992).
Kellogg, 727 F.3d at 355.
10 FLETCHER, supra note 52, § 4877.
Kellogg, 727 F.3d at 355.
Id.
Id.
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exclusive.167 In fact, it is the same set of questions that must be answered
by a consideration of the facts of the case.168
Judge Jolly also distinguished that § 55(a)(2) of the statute imposed
strict liability on corporations whether or not the violation was known
because corporations are typically held liable for the torts of employees
who act within the scope of their employment.169 Therefore, if the “scope
of employment” or “apparent authority” tests were applied to § 55(a)(2), the
analysis would be identical and hold a corporation redundantly liable under
both sections for any violations.170 However, because § 55(a)(1) included
the scienter requirement, the analysis should not be the same.171 Without
knowing more facts of the case, it is impossible to say that the knowledge
of the specific employee in this case was sufficient to impose vicarious
liability upon the corporation.172 As a result, Judge Jolly agreed that the
case should be reversed and remanded for trial.173
IV. ANALYSIS
In this case, the majority inappropriately determined that vicarious
liability could be imputed to a corporation under § 55(a)(1) of the Act. Part
A of this section argues why the majority’s dismissal of the punitive
characteristics of the damages clause was a determining factor in its
application of vicarious liability. Part B argues why the majority’s
disregard of the act-for-the-benefit-of-the-principal rule of agency was
overly dismissive.
A. The majority’s dismissal of the punitive characteristics of the penalties
in the Act was a determining factor in its application of vicarious liability.
In this case, the majority concluded early that § 55(a)(1) of the Act
allowed the application of vicarious liability to a corporation by simply
substituting “corporation” for “person” without considering the meaning of
the clause in its entirety.174 With that simple substitution, § 55(a)(1) states,
“the Federal Government . . . may recover from a [corporation] that
knowingly engages in [prohibited conduct] . . . .”175 However, ending the

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 356 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 354 (majority opinion).
41 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1) (1986), amended by 41 U.S.C. § 8706 (2011).
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interpretation here would not fully answer the question at hand.176 As
Judge Jolly explained in his concurrence, the determination of whether
vicarious liability could be applied to this clause does not end at the
substitution of the word “person” for “corporation.”177 The majority should
have continued its analysis to determine whether the knowledge of an
individual could be imputed upon a corporation to hold that corporation
liable for knowing violations of the Act.178 The exercise of statutory
interpretation is more complex than the simple substitution the majority
applied.179
In this case, the majority failed to recognize that the nature of the
damages recoverable under the clause is determinative as to the application
of imputed knowledge of a corporation.180 The court should have
determined whether § 55(a)(1) was punitive or remedial prior to deciding
whether vicarious liability could be imposed upon a corporation.181
1. It is not clear whether the damages contained in § 55(a)(1) of the Act are
punitive or remedial.
Because this is a case of first impression regarding the Act, the court
should look to the interpretation of similar statutes, such as the False
Claims Act182, for guidance.183 The False Claims Act contains a “double
damages” penalty clause that compares to the Anti-Kickback Act.184 Under
the False Claims Act, a person or corporation who
knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or
statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to
the Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly
avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to
the Government, is liable to the United States Government for a civil
penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, as adjusted by
the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, plus 3 times

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Kellogg, 727 F.3d at 354.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 562, 544 (1999).
Id.; see also Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 114–15 (1893); see also
Hyslop v. United States, 261 F.2d 786, 792 (8th Cir. 1958); United States v. Ridglea State Bank,
357 F.2d 497, 499–500 (5th Cir. 1966).
182. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2009).
183. Kellogg, 727 F.3d at 345.
184. See 41 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1) (1986), amended by 41 U.S.C. § 8706 (2011); Id. § 55, amended by 41
U.S.C. § 8706.
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the amount of the damages which the Government sustains because of the
act of that person.185

In United States ex rel. Brensilber v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the forfeiture and damage
provisions of the False Claim Act were “not only penal, but drastically
penal. . . [and f]or this reason, it has been strictly construed.”186 In Hyslop
v. United States, the Eighth Circuit likewise held this forfeiture clause penal
in nature.187 Contrarily, in a split decision in United States ex rel. Marcus
v. Hess, the Supreme Court held that the “double damages” clause of the
False Claims Act was “remedial” because it merely “afford[ed] the
Government complete indemnity for the injuries done to it.”188 The Third
and Fourth Circuits agreed with this holding, and found that the clause was
remedial in nature and imposed only restitutionary damages.189 In more
recent cases, it seems the U.S. Supreme Court has shifted its view from
Hess and has held that the forfeiture provisions of the False Claims Act are,
indeed, punitive and not merely compensatory, especially in cases where
the Government seeks to recover damages that exceedingly outweigh its
actual loss.190 The D.C. and Fifth Circuits have applied the same standard
in United States ex rel. Long v. SCS Business & Technical Institute, Inc.
and United States v. Ridglea State Bank.191
Although courts, including the Supreme Court, are divided about
whether similar statutory clauses are punitive, the trend is shifting toward
considering “double damages” clauses punitive.192 If it is determined to be
punitive, then the clause should be strictly construed to only impute the
requisite intent or knowledge of the actor to a corporation when the
authority of the actor is clear: typically, when the corporation either
expressly authorized or ratified the actions.193

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

192.
193.

31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2009).
United States ex rel. Brensilber v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 131 F.2d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1942).
Hyslop v. United States, 261 F.2d 786, 792 (8th Cir. 1958).
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549 (1943) (explaining that a violator could
be punished both criminally and civilly without violating double jeopardy).
United States v. Granni, 172 F.2d 507, 514–15 (4th Cir. 1949); United States v. Posner, 269 F.2d
742, 745 (3d Cir. 1959).
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447–49 (1989); Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 93
(1997).
United States ex rel. Long v. SCS Business & Technical Institute, Inc., 173 F.3d 870, 877–78
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding FCA damages are “punitive” and not merely compensatory); United
States v. Ridglea State Bank, 357 F.2d 495, 499–500 (5th Cir. 1966) (holding FCA damages were
punitive based, at least in part, on the disparity between the recovery demanded and the
Government’s actual losses).
Halper, 490 U.S. at 447–49; Hudson, 522 U.S. at 93; SCS Business, 173 F.3d at 877–78; Ridglea,
357 F.2d at 499–500.
Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 542–43 (1999).
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2. The principal cannot be held vicariously liable for punitive damages for
the unauthorized misdeeds of its agent.
Historically, courts have been divided as to whether statutory clauses
like the one in § 55(a)(1) of the Act are punitive or remedial; however, it is
imperative that a court evaluate the nature of the clause before considering
whether a corporation may be held vicariously liable. When a clause has
been determined to be punitive, courts have consistently held that an
employer cannot be held liable for the unauthorized misdeeds of its
employees.194 As a result, if the clause does impose punitive damages, then
it must be strictly construed to apply only to corporations that have ratified
or otherwise authorized the Act.195
In Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railroad Co. v. Prentice, the
Court held that a principal could not be held liable for exemplary or
punitive damages merely by reason of wanton, oppressive, or malicious
intent on the part of the agent.196 In Hyslop, the Court opined that the
punitive clause must be strictly construed, limiting the scope of vicarious
liability against government prime contractors to cases where authorization
was clear.197 In 1999, the Court reaffirmed the limited application of
vicarious liability for punitive damages saying that it was improper to
punish someone (e.g., a corporation) for the acts of another.198 The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed in Ridglea saying it was against established
agency-law principles and unjust to hold an employer liable for the
unauthorized, illegal acts of the employee.199
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which deals with employment
discrimination, was amended in 1991 to include punitive penalties against
corporations or individuals who intentionally violate Title VII.200 Because
of the punitive nature of the penalties, courts have held that the statute must
be strictly construed.201 The Fourth Circuit addressed a Title VII Civil
Rights case in Harris v. L&L Wings, Inc. and explained at great length that
punitive damages should only be awarded in cases of egregious conduct.202
In 1999, the Eleventh Circuit agreed in Dudley v. Wal-mart Stores, Inc., and
194. The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. 546, 558–59 (1818) (holding that actual wrongdoers in marine
trespass are responsible for exemplary damages, but the owners of the privateers are not
responsible beyond the actual loss or injury sustained).
195. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 530.
196. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 114–15 (1893).
197. Hyslop v. United States, 261 F.2d 786, 792 (8th Cir. 1958).
198. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 544.
199. United States v. Ridglea State Bank, 357 F.2d 495, 499–500 (5th Cir. 1966).
200. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1991)).
201. Harris v. L&L Wings, Inc., 132 F.3d 978, 983–85 (4th Cir. 1997); Dudley v. Wal-mart Stores,
Inc., 166 F.3d 1317, 1322–23 (11th Cir. 1999); Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 528.
202. Harris, 132 F.3d at 983–85.
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held that punitive damages, under Title VII, should be reserved for
egregious cases.203 In Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, the U.S. Supreme
Court applied the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 909 approach in
conjunction with the Restatement of Agency’s “scope of employment” rule
stating that holding an employer vicariously liable for punitive damages as
a result of the actions of any of its employees was improper because it
would punish a party who was personally innocent.204 The Court explained
that a corporation may be held liable for punitive damages as a result of the
actions of its employees only in the limited circumstances where the
corporation authorized or ratified the wrongful acts.205
In Kolstad, the U.S. Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to a Title
VII Civil Rights case and articulated that the policy behind applying such
scrutiny to punitive clauses is that it would be improper to punish a person
or corporation for the acts of another.206 The Fifth Circuit previously
applied the same standard in Ridglea.207
In Ridglea, the court opined that an employer could not be held liable
for double damages under the False Claims Act’s “double damages” clause
because the award sought by the Government was grossly disproportionate
to the damages incurred.208 In that case, the False Claims Act provided for
the Government to receive double the amount of actual losses plus an
automatic forfeiture of $2,000 per occurrence.209 Even though the
Government’s actual losses totaled $2,038.62, it sought damages totaling
$23,591.14, including the automatic forfeitures.210 Section 55(a)(1) of the
Anti-Kickback Act nearly mirrors the language of the False Claims Act by
allowing the Government to receive double the amount of the kickback plus
$11,000211 for each occurrence.212 Because the statutes are so similar, the
court should consistently interpret their meanings.213 To do otherwise
would leave government contractors without clear guidance or expectations
concerning their conduct under the Acts.214
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206.
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208.
209.
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211.

Dudley, 166 F.3d at 1322–23.
Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 528.
Id. at 526.
Id.
United States v. Ridglea State Bank, 357 F.2d 495, 500 (5th Cir. 1966).
Id.
Id. at 499.
Id.
“Acting under the authority of the Federal Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of
1990, 28 U.S.C. § 2461 (2006), the Department of Justice increased the amount of the penalty in
§55(a)(1)(B) from $10,000, its original statutory amount, to $11,000. 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(13).”
United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 727 F.3d 343, 347 n.6 (5th Cir. 2013).
212. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2009); see also 41 U.S.C. § 55 (1986), amended by 41 U.S.C. § 8706
(2011).
213. 2B SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. § 53:3 (7th ed. 2013).
214. Id.
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Because of the obvious discrepancy in the court’s rulings in these
cases, the majority reconciled its holding with its earlier ruling in Ridglea
by distinguishing the specific language of the clauses.215 The False Claims
Act contains language that mandates an automatic forfeiture of $2,000 per
occurrence, and the court does not have discretion to award a lesser
amount.216 This Act, on the other hand, contains language that allows the
government to recover up to $11,000 per occurrence.217 Because the court
may decide the amount of damages actually awarded, the majority
explained, the clause of this Act is unique from the False Claims Act and
may be interpreted differently.218
The majority’s minimalist approach to statutory interpretation in this
case is not persuasive. Even though the language of the clauses may be
distinguished, the effect is the same. In Kellogg, the violating employees
received nominal kickbacks including golf outings, sports tickets, drinks,
and meals.219 The value of these kickbacks in total was inconsequential
compared to the amount of damages sought by the Government.220 In
Ridglea, the court applied a strict standard because the damages the
Government was seeking were grossly disproportionate to the actual loss.221
The same is true here. As the majority has applied the statute, the
Government is entitled to receive double the value of the kickbacks plus
$11,000 for every occurrence.222 As the government has alleged in this
case, those damages could total more than $1,700,000.223 The kickbacks
actually received by KBR employees for which the government may have
been charged pale in comparison to such a staggering penalty.224
In Ridglea, the same Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that it was
against established agency-law principles and unjust to hold an employer
liable for the unauthorized, illegal acts of the employee.225 Because the
statutory language from Kellogg relates so closely to the language in
Ridglea, the court should have applied the same reasoning in this case.226
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Kellogg, 727 F.3d at 352.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 345.
Id.
United States v. Ridglea State Bank, 357 F.2d 495, 500 (5th Cir. 1966).
Kellogg, 727 F.3d at 345.
This estimate was calculated by including 148 occurrences (93 kickbacks from EGL and 55
kickbacks from Panalpina) at $11,000 per occurrence = $1,628,000. Amount was rounded up to
$1,700,000 to include estimates of actual losses of total kickbacks received, up-charges, and fees.
Id.
224. Actual kickbacks included meals, drinks, golf outings, sports events, and other gifts and
entertainment. Id.
225. Ridglea, 357 F.2d at 498.
226. 2B SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST., supra note 213.
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B. The majority’s disregard of the act-for-the-benefit-of-the-principal rule
of agency was overly dismissive.
Traditionally, the Fifth Circuit has conservatively imputed vicarious
liability to a corporation in limited circumstances where the employee was
acting within the scope of his employment or acting for the benefit of his
employer.227 This application has been extended to cases where the
employee acted with the purpose to benefit the employer even if the
employer did not actually receive a benefit.228 On the other hand, the court
has declined to apply vicarious liability in cases where the employee acted
for his own benefit and not for the benefit of the employer.229 Nevertheless,
the majority in this case rejected the act-for-the-benefit-of-the-principal
doctrine and downplayed its importance by burying the issue in its
discussion of the punitive damages question addressed in Part A. In cases
like the one at bar, the act-for-the-benefit-of-the-principal doctrine is
inextricably intertwined with the application of punitive damages, but the
test and its effects are independent and distinct.
Two decisions from the Fifth District are on point with the issue in
Kellogg: Ridglea230 and Hangar One.231 In Ridglea, a bank vice president
approved false loan documents for submission to the Federal Housing
Administration knowing the loans would default.232 The court found that
the employee knew the loans would default and the bank would not benefit
from them; contrarily, the bank would lose money on the transaction.233
Therefore, the bank could not be held liable for his misdeeds.234 In Hangar
One, the corporation was a prime contractor for the U.S. Department of
Defense that provided ammunition during the Vietnam War.235 Some of the
corporation’s employees were overlooking defects in the ammunition on
the production lines and allowing defective ammunition to be sold to the
Government.236 Because there was no benefit in providing defecting
ammunition to the Government, the court held that the corporation could
not be held liable for the actions of its employees because the employees
were not acting to benefit the corporation.237

227. See Ridglea, 357 F.2d at 500; see also Standard Oil Co. of Tex. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120,
128 (5th Cir. 1962).
228. Standard Oil, 307 F.2d at 128.
229. Ridglea, 357 F.2d at 500.
230. Id.
231. United States v. Hangar One, Inc., 563 F.2d 1155, 1155 (5th Cir. 1977).
232. Ridglea, 357 F.2d at 498.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Hangar One, 563 F.2d at 1157.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1158.
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Standard Oil was a case involving criminal liability under the Hot Oil
Act.238 The court held that the employer, Standard Oil, was not criminally
liable because vicarious liability did not apply in cases where the employee
did not act for the benefit of the employer.239 In Ridglea, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed Standard Oil by applying the same test to a civil statutory
violation.240 However, in Kellogg, the majority declined to apply such a
test.241 Utilizing the same rationale as discussed in Part A supra, the
majority reasoned that the statutory penalty in the Anti-Kickback Act did
not impose mandatory punitive damages as in the False Claims Act;
therefore, the employee need not have acted for the benefit of the employer
in order for the Government to recover.242 This disregard of the act-for-thebenefit-of-the-principal was incorrect.
In Kellogg, the employees were not accepting kickbacks from
subcontractors for the benefit of the corporation.243 They were accepting
the kickbacks for their own benefit.244 The Government could hardly
contend that golf outings and sports tickets furthered the mission of the
corporation. Consequentially, if the majority had applied the act-for-thebenefit-of-the-principal standard to this case, it would have found that
vicarious liability could not be imputed to the corporation under § 55(a)(1)
of the Act.
V. CONCLUSION
The Fifth District Court of Appeals incorrectly decided that § 55(a)(1)
of the Anti-Kickback Act allows vicarious liability to be imputed to a
corporation for the acts of its employees. Its limited statutory interpretation
left the clause no more “interpreted” after its evaluation than before. The
issue of whether “person” included “corporation” was not in dispute. The
deciding factor was whether the corporation had the requisite knowledge to
satisfy the clause. Even though there are many tests to determine whether
vicarious liability applies, and subsequently what “knowledge” may be
imputed to the corporation, this court failed to consider the punitive nature
of the damages sought and rejected its own precedent by refusing to apply
the act-for-the-benefit-of-the-principal doctrine. Had the majority followed
its own precedent, the decision to apply vicarious liability would have been
quite different. In this case, the majority turned a blind eye to the
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

See generally Standard Oil Co. of Tex. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962).
Id. at 129.
United States v. Ridglea State Bank, 357 F.2d 495, 500 (5th Cir. 1966).
United States ex rel. Vavra v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 727 F.3d 343, 350–52 (5th Cir. 2013).
Id.
Id. at 345.
Id.
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similarities between its prior decisions and the case at hand and
subsequently failed to consistently apply vicarious liability to corporate
defendants.

